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One thing about technical artefacts that needs to be explained is how their physical make-up, or
structure, enables them to fulﬁl the behaviour associated with their function, or, more colloquially,
how they work. In this paper I develop an account of such explanations based on the familiar notion
of mechanistic explanation. To accomplish this, I (1) outline two explanatory strategies that provide
two diﬀerent types of insight into an artefact’s functioning, and (2) show how human action inevi-
tably plays a role in artefact explanation. I then use my own account to criticize other recent work on
mechanistic explanation and conclude with some general implications for the philosophy of
explanation.
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If anything, technical artefacts must be susceptible to mechanistic explanation; an
explanation that exhibits the causal mechanisms underlying a behavioural regularity.
Tailored to the artefact case, a mechanistic explanation consists in showing the causal
mechanisms underlying an artefact’s behaviour. Since artefacts are designed, created,
and used for their ability to exhibit one or a few speciﬁc behaviours associated with
their function(s), the typical candidate behaviour requiring explanation is the behaviour
that corresponds to the artefact’s function. Therefore, I will henceforth use the term0039-3681/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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show the behaviour linked with fulﬁlling (one of) its function(s).1 Or, to put it more
colloquially, a mechanistic artefact explanation is an answer to the question: How does
this thing work?
My goal in this paper is two-tiered. Primarily, I want to give an account of mechanistic
artefact explanations. However, I believe that this project generates spin-oﬀ that bears on
mechanistic explanation in general. Hence, my secondary goal is to look at some recent
work on mechanistic explanation and to indicate how it may beneﬁt from insights derived
from my account of artefact explanation.
Given these goals, the set-up of the paper follows straightforwardly. I begin with some
real-life examples of artefact explanations in the next section. These examples lead to
reﬂections on (1) the structure of mechanistic artefact explanations (Section 3) and (2)
the role human action plays in them (Section 4). Taken together, these reﬂections provide
the ingredients for a general account of mechanistic artefact explanation. In Section 5, a
comparison of my view with other work reveals how my account exposes an ambiguity
that seems to pervade other recent accounts of mechanistic explanation. In Section 6, I
conclude with some thoughts on what I dub the realization-independency of mechanistic
explanation.
Before I present my examples, let me ﬁrst sketch the expected pay-oﬀs of this pro-
ject. First, philosophers writing on mechanistic explanation tend to be rather imprecise
in their characterization of it. This is deﬁnitely true for the original proponents of
mechanistic explanation (Railton, 1978; Salmon, 1984), but in my opinion even more
recent work (Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Craver, 2001; Glennan, 2002) still
lacks suﬃcient precision. My account reveals some ambiguities arising out of this
imprecision.
Secondly, there is something idiosyncratic about mechanistic artefact explanation. It
always involves reference to human action under some appropriate description. This is
not supposed to be a very profound assertion; I only wish to draw attention to the trivial
point that artefacts do not do anything without human agency. They ‘work’ only when we
use them and as a result, an explanation of their working must include information about
human action. This feature sets artefact explanation apart from mechanistic explanation
in the sciences. Natural science aims to describe mechanisms in the world that do not
involve human action, while social science focuses on social mechanisms, which do not
include physical objects2 but only (collective) human intentional states and actions. On
the face of it, mechanistic artefact explanations involve an unusual explanatory combina-
tion of human action and physical objects. Showing how this combination works is there-
fore a second pay-oﬀ.
Thirdly, I conjecture that my account will also bring out another central feature of
mechanistic explanation, which, as far as I know, has gone largely unnoticed in recent dis-
cussions. It is the realization-independency I referred to above.1 My project thus does not concern functional explanation. In a mechanistic artefact explanation, the function
ﬁgures in the explanandum; a functional explanation is traditionally conceived as having a function ascription in
the explanans.
2 At least not in a non-symbolic role, I presume.
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As examples, I have selected explanations of two relatively simple pieces of technology.
The ﬁrst example is a paperclip and the second is Thomas Edison’s ﬁrst ‘phonograph or
speaking machine’. Paperclips have come in many shapes, sizes, and colours for over a
century.3 They all work according to the same basic principle. The example I want to dis-
cuss, however, explicitly shows human action in its patent, which makes it especially apt
for expository purposes. Take a look at Figure 1.4 It nicely depicts what one is supposed to
do with this paperclip to make it work.
At the risk of belabouring the obvious, let’s look a little closer at how a paperclip
works.5 It does not just slide on papers by itself; we have to put it in place by opening
the clip and pressing the longer loop against one side of the papers and at the same time
ﬂexing it just enough for the smaller loop to slide over the other side. The paperclip in my
example actually has to be handled slightly diﬀerently, as the patent pictures show vividly.
What subsequently makes the paperclip do its job is springiness; or rather the force exerted
on the papers that results from the paperclip’s springing action. Like any material, steel
has a characteristic springiness or elasticity. The behaviour resulting from this elasticity
is described by Hooke’s law: ‘As the extension so the force’. More prosaically:
F = kX. Up to a limit, the material’s elastic limit, beyond which permanent deformation
occurs, the more we stretch something, the more resistance it oﬀers to further stretching.
This is the key to paperclip behaviour: ﬂexing the loops somewhat out of their normal
plane position causes them to exert a force in the opposite direction, thus clamping onto
the papers.
Although Thomas Edison’s ‘phonograph or speaking machine’ is a more sophisticated
device than the paperclip, its operational principles are still relatively easy to grasp. The
patent drawings are shown in Figure 2 (note that the drawings labelled ‘Fig. 3’ and
‘Fig. 4’ are alternative recording devices, not shown in the main drawings).6 The letters
in the drawing indicate the principal components: A is a cylinder with a helix-shaped
groove pattern on its surface. Recording material, according to Edison preferably metallic
foil, is fastened on the surface of A. Cylinder A is secured to shaft X (note that X has screw
thread on one end), which is supported by P and O. Support P also has screw thread on its
inside. At one end, the upside of Figure 2, X enters tube L, which has an elongated slot in
it. L can be rotated by device M and because X has a pin (2) secured to it that is sticking
through the slot in L, X can also rotate. With the action of the screw thread on P’s inside,
X will start moving towards O. Component B is a mouthpiece and G is its diaphragm,
which has a hard pin-like indenting point at its centre poised exactly perpendicular to
the surface of A. In its operating position, this point indents the recording material. On
the other side, a similar assembly is placed: C is roughly the same sort of device as B
but functions as a speaker. Its diaphragm F also has an indenting point ﬁxed at its centre,
but this one is held in place by a light spring D that presses it in the grooves made in the
recording material on A’s surface.3 Those interested in their history and development, as well as that of other everyday artefacts, will enjoy
reading Henry Petroski’s books, for example Petroski (1992, 1996).
4 The image is from the online US Patent Databases, http://www.uspto.gov.
5 The explanation is based on Petroski’s account of the history of the paperclip (Petroski, 1996).
6 Available through http://www.uspto.gov, or http://edison.rutgers.edu/patents/00200521.PDF.
Fig. 1. H. E. Giﬀord’s patented paperclip improvement.
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speaks in the mouthpiece B the air vibrations will cause the diaphragm to vibrate so that
the indenting point at its centre will make indentations in the rotating recording material
on A’s surface. As X’s rotation makes A move in the direction of O, the recorded track
becomes spiral shaped. The track’s pattern of indentations will represent voice movements
and strength. Recording can continue until A reaches its utmost position at O. The record-
ing material can then be removed from A and stored for later use, or it can be ‘rewound’ to
its initial position to be played again. If C is placed in position, that is, its point placed
exactly in a groove of the recorded material and held in place by spring D, and M makes
A rotate again, the movements of C’s point will make diaphragm F vibrate according to
the recorded pattern so that the resulting air vibrations replicate the original recorded
voice.
Fig. 2. Edison’s original patented phonograph.
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I want to look at the examples in the opposite order of presentation for I believe that
questions about the role of human actions are better appreciated in the light of a more
general pattern of artefact explanation, which is provided by the second example. I pick
up the pieces for an account of artefact explanation as I go along discussing my examples
in this and the next section.
We should ﬁrst become a little clearer on the explanandum. By asking: How does this
thing work? we express an interest in a certain type of behaviour of the thing in question,
typically the behaviour for which it was designed or is commonly used, the behaviour
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exhibit that behaviour and thus to fulﬁl its function. Edison’s patent exempliﬁes such an
explanandum; it demonstrates how the phonograph realizes the behaviour for which it
was designed: ‘to record in permanent characters the human voice and other sounds, from
which characters such sounds may be reproduced and rendered audible again at a future
time’ (Eddison, 1878, p. 1). Note that this description is silent about the means by which
the behaviour is to be accomplished. The explanandum is phrased purely in terms of
behavioural roles;7 it only describes the behaviour the phonograph fulﬁls without refer-
ring to the way in which, or the means by which, this behaviour is enabled. This is what
the explanans should provide; some story about what is inside the behavioural black box,
how the behavioural role is enabled by an underlying mechanism.
There is another thing to note about the explanandum. As several authors in this issue
have noted (Franssen, 2006; Kroes & Meijers, 2006; Scheele, 2006; Vermaas & Houkes,
2006), ascriptions of technical functions are entangled in a normative discourse that does
not apply to physical behaviour. It makes perfect sense to speak of an artefact’s proper
technical function, but not of its proper physical behaviour. Artefacts can exhibit numerous
physical behaviours but from a physical point of view there is nothing proper about one
particular behaviour as opposed to another. There is a gap of normativity between an arte-
fact’s proper function and its (actual) physical behaviour. As a result of this, the explan-
andum of a mechanistic artefact explanation can be interpreted in two diﬀerent ways: (1)
factually, that is, as being about the artefact’s actual workings, or (2) normatively, that is,
about how the artefact ought to work, if it is to fulﬁl its proper function. If the artefact is
not broken or severely worn, and is used in a proper way in suitable circumstances, that is,
does not malfunction, these two interpretations run parallel. Divergence occurs when the
artefact malfunctions. I will return to this point in due course and show how the two read-
ings lead to analogously diﬀerent explanantia.
Now, for the explanans, let us look at the following two examples. First, when
describing the mouthpiece Edison glances over the speciﬁc details of the device, but
does write: ‘[it] may be of any desired character, so long as proper slots or holes are
provided to re-enforce the hissing consonants’ (Eddison, 1878, p. 1). Apparently, one
of the behaviours of the mouthpiece is to reinforce hissing consonants and Edison says
that any implementation will do ﬁne, as long as it shows this behaviour. In eﬀect, he
places a behavioural constraint on any proposed mouthpiece implementation by stipu-
lating its role. The second example has to do with cylinder A. Here, Edison speciﬁes
various implementation details: the number of grooves per inch on its surface, the heli-
cal pattern of the grooves, the indenting material on the surface, and A’s being secured
to shaft X. Subsequently, he explicates how these structural features result in various
behaviours, together enabling the recording behaviour, as discussed in Section 2. These
two examples exemplify two prima facie diﬀerent explanatory strategies; the former
working its way ‘downward’ from the overall behaviour towards the components imple-
menting the required sub-behaviours, and the latter working ‘upwards’ from the struc-
tural features of the components to the overall behaviour. We might say that the ﬁrst
strategy provides behavioural or functional understanding of an artefact, and the second7 Or, alternatively, in functional terms, but since the notion of technical function is used throughout this issue
with normative connotations, as in ‘proper function’, I will refrain from using the term ‘function’ in a non-
normative sense here.
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son (1993, p. 18) describe roughly the same strategies, but call them the analytic and
synthetic strategy.8 To
Cumm
strateg
anothe
behavi
implemTop-down strategy: take the behaviour to be explained and decompose it into more
basic sub-behaviours, reiterate this step if possible, it should become clear how the
complex behaviour being explained is realized by simpler behaviours in a speciﬁc
spatiotemporal conﬁguration, and for all the sub-behaviours, indicate which compo-
nent(s) take(s) care of them.
Bottom-up strategy: name the structural components of the artefact and give infor-
mation about their physicochemical make-up and spatial conﬁguration, show how
their physicochemical features and conﬁguration result in various behaviours and
then describe how these behaviours, in their spatiotemporal conﬁguration, together
make up the behaviour to be explained.8A couple of remarks about these two strategies are in place. First, the top-down strat-
egy allows for decompositions of the overall behaviour that are still completely phrased in
behavioural role terms, black-boxing implementation details. However, at some level the
proposed implementation will nonetheless come into play implicitly since it dictates how a
speciﬁc sub-behaviour must be decomposed. To see this, look at Figure 2 again. Whereas
the big drawings on the patent show how to record sounds by indenting metallic foil, the
smaller ones to the left and right exemplify other possible sub-behaviours for the recording
function: moving a thread and impressing the shape of the thread on a roll of paper or
depositing more or less ink on a roll of paper. The general picture emerging is that an over-
all behaviour is decomposed until the sub-behaviours necessitate a choice for one of pos-
sibly many functionally equivalent implementations. This choice then determines how the
sub-behaviour in question is decomposed. This procedure repeats itself at lower levels of
sub-behaviours until all the structural components have been ascribed their roles in the
overall behavioural decomposition.
Secondly, both strategies mention decomposition, but not in quite the same sense. The
ﬁrst strategy is based on behavioural decomposition, the second on structural decomposi-
tion, that is, decomposition into physical parts. These two do not necessarily carve up the
artefact into the same parts. One sub-behaviour can be implemented by more than one
structural part and one structural part can play more than one behavioural role. If we
think of the behavioural decomposition as producing a set of sub-behaviours B and the
structural decomposition as producing a set of physical parts S, the relation between
the two decompositions can be described as an n:n mapping between the elements of B
and S, and if each sub-behaviour is implemented by a separate part, the mapping degen-
erates to a 1:1 case. Figure 3 provides a schematic example of this mapping; the bis
represent sub-behaviours and the sis structural parts. The dotted lines specify the mapping
between the two. Roughly speaking, the top-down strategy lays down the behaviouralanyone familiar with the literature on functional analysis, these two strategies may seem identical with
ins’s analytical and subsumption strategies (Cummins, 1975, pp. 758–760). This is not quite true, for (1) my
ies are both self-contained as explanations of artefact behaviour, while his are incomplete without one
r and (2) it seems in principle possible to conduct both of Cummins’s strategies wholly in functional, or
oural, terms, whereas my bottom-up strategy intrinsically includes a description of the underlying physical
entation.
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Fig. 3. Illustration of mapping between behavioural and structural decompositions.
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strategy ﬁrst lays down the structural decomposition and then assigns behavioural parts
their place therein. The strategies’ starting points diﬀer, but they both use both decompo-
sitions because both their end products include the mapping between the two decomposi-
tions. So although each explanatory strategy is self-contained, the two decompositions are
complementary, in the sense that (1) the behavioural decomposition ‘prescribes’ which of
the many behaviours of the structural parts are of interest and (2) the structural decom-
position ‘prescribes’ to which of the physical parts the various sub-behaviours from the
behavioural decomposition may be ascribed.
Thirdly, both strategies allow for multilevel explanations: behaviours can be broken
up into sub-behaviours, parts can be broken up into parts of parts, and so on. A natural
endpoint for the decomposition process, and for the explanation, seems to be the small-
est physical components that make up the artefact (by which I mean the stuﬀ one ﬁnds
on assembly drawings of the artefact, not elementary particles) and the sub-behaviours
they implement. It might be possible to continue explaining properties of elementary
components, but then we leave the domain of engineering and enter that of natural
science.
The obvious question now is how the two strategies are related. The ﬁrst thing to note is
that the top-down strategy does not seem to make much sense for the paperclip case. Paper-
clip behaviour is so basic that it is insusceptible to further decomposition. In a case like this
the top-down strategy would amount to an assertion that this paperclip-shaped piece of
metal exerts a force when its loops are bent out of position, which is hardly explanatory
since this simply is paperclip behaviour and nothing is decomposed and thereby made more
intelligible (I am ignoring the human action part of the explanation for now). At the same
time, the bottom-up strategy makes perfect sense; the explanation of the paperclip I gave
earlier embodies it. This suggests that the top-down strategy only conveys explanatory
information for artefacts incorporating some degree of complexity, for example by having
more than one behavioural and/or structural part.9 For simple artefacts, the behavioural
decomposition consists of only the overall behaviour or it is wholly determined by the spe-
ciﬁc implementation chosen so that it becomes impossible to provide a behavioural decom-
position without at the same time describing the physical implementation. For example, the9 This shows immediately when we consider a slightly more complex ‘species’ of paperclips: the little two-legged
clamps held together by a coiled spring. For such paperclips the top-down strategy makes more sense since this
type of paperclip has a few components with diﬀerent behavioural roles.
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decomposed, if at all, cf. note 9.
Secondly, the two strategies go together very well. Partly, they overlap in both produc-
ing the mapping between structural and behavioural decompositions, and for the other
part, they are complementary. Roughly, the bottom-up strategy picks up where the top-
down strategy stops. The output of the latter is an overview of all the sub-behaviours
and the components that exhibit them. The former strategy then produces the structural,
physicochemical, underpinning for the behaviours by showing which properties of the
components enable them. Given this close cooperation, one might wonder if the two strat-
egies should not simply be combined into one strategy. I think the answer is negative, for
such a combined strategy would place too rigorous a requirement on artefact explanation.
It seems incorrect to maintain that a good artefact explanation must always provide the
structural underpinning delivered by the bottom-up strategy; it is often perfectly adequate
to answer ‘how does this work’ questions by decomposing the behaviour and asserting that
the components exhibit the identiﬁed sub-behaviours. In particular, the bottom-up strat-
egy seems to be appropriate primarily in an engineering or design context. Engineers must
know about the properties of the materials and components they use in design and they
should be able to give an account of how these properties result in the relevant behaviours.
In most everyday contexts however, people are not interested in the gory details, but only
need a rough behavioural understanding of how a complex behaviour is produced.10
Behavioural understanding is also particularly important in the early stages of engineering
design, when engineers considers various possible conceptual design, without (yet) worry-
ing about technical implementation details.
4. What about human action?
So far, I have said nothing about the role of human action in artefact explanation. The
paperclip example can shed more light on this role. Let me ﬁrst draw a sketchy picture of
artefact use in general (cf. Houkes, Vermaas, Dorst, & De Vries, 2002). People use arte-
facts to accomplish goals and they do so by manipulating them according to more or less
standardized use plans that involve sequences of actions. By doing something with an arte-
fact, a change in the obtaining state-of-aﬀairs is brought about that moves the artefact user
closer to a desired state-of-aﬀairs. In this picture, we need to ﬁnd out how it is that actions
with artefacts contribute to realizing a desired state-of-aﬀairs.
In the paperclip case, the action involved is the slight bending of the loops by pressing
the longest loop against the papers and then sliding the clip on. Although humans typically
perform this action, it is beyond question that the paperclip would still work were a robot
or zombie to perform the same action. This shows that the intentionality of the actions per-
formed with artefacts does not really matter for our understanding of how an artefact
works. The only thing that matters is the physical movements going on, regardless of
whether humans, zombies, or robots are responsible for bringing these movements about.
A distinction from action theory between an action qua intentional action and an action
qua physical event can clarify this point. When I beckon someone to come over, my hand
moves along a trajectory. This physical movement of my hand is the action qua physical10 Vermaas & Houkes (2006) capture an analogous point with their notion of cloaking.
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the extent that human actions are involved in artefact use, the intrinsic events associated
with these actions alone suﬃce to explain the artefact’s operation. Obviously, intrinsic
events do not suﬃce to explain why an artefact was used or designed in the ﬁrst place,
but those are diﬀerent explanatory tasks. To understand the physical operations of the
artefact, ‘how it works’, we need only see what sort of physical processes are going on.
Although it is surely of practical value to know which of these processes are typically
brought about by human actions, it does not matter for the artefact’s proper operation
if in fact they are brought about by a robot or a skilful monkey. The intrinsic event is
doing the explanatory work here and not the intentional aspect of the action.
However, there is more to say about how actions and physical artefact behaviour go
together in an artefact explanation. Both explanatory strategies from the previous section
rely on the, so far unspeciﬁed, notion of behaviour. Saying that an object can be made to
behave in certain ways is to claim that it possesses certain physical capacities, namely those
that give rise to the behaviours in question. If a doorbell rings when someone presses it, it
must have the capacity to ring when pressed. Sugar dissolves in water because it has the
capacity to do so. Objects have capacities in virtue of their physical make-up, that is,
the conﬁguration and constituent materials of their components and ultimately the prop-
erties of their constituent materials; this is what the bottom-up strategy exposes. Because a
paperclip is made of bent metal wire, it has a certain springiness, which gives it its paper-
clipping capacity. Capacities can be expressed by conditional statements: if an object x has
the capacity to F it must be true that x Fs if G-ed, provided appropriate background con-
ditions obtain and no counteracting inﬂuences disturb the process. The ﬁrst proviso is
indispensable because behaviours may only occur under more or less special circum-
stances; the second because of the always present possibility of pre-empting inﬂuences,
cf. Mumford (1996, pp. 90–91) for the two sorts of conditions.11
With this conditional analysis, we can see clearly what role human actions—or, more
precisely, the intrinsic events associated with human actions—play in an artefact explana-
tion. They provide the antecedent events on which manifestation of certain capacities is
conditional. Human actions ‘stimulate’ the artefact in appropriate ways for it to respond
by exhibiting its behavioural capacities. I bend the loops of the paperclip out of position
and it exerts a force in the opposite direction that holds a set of papers together. Some-
body speaks into the mouthpiece of Edison’s phonograph, the diaphragm starts to vibrate,
and the indenting point indents the recording material. By manipulating an artefact you
trigger one of its (sub-)capacities to occur; the intrinsic event associated with your action
provides G, which makes the artefact (or one of its components) F.
Let us take stock. What is the ensuing picture of artefact explanation? An explanation
of how an artefact works according to the top-down strategy provides a collection of sub-
behaviours at various levels, eventually all ascribed to particular structural components of
the artefact, and their interactions, that is, how some behaviours provide antecedent or
background conditions for others. For some behaviours, there will typically be reference
to at least one intrinsic event triggering those behaviours. This explanation can be comple-11 I am aware that this paragraph passes over some tantalizingly diﬃcult issues as to the nature of dispositional
and categorical properties, capacities, conditionals, and their mutual relations, but a discussion of these issues
would lead us too far astray. Therefore I must ask the reader to bear with me and accept this common sense
picture of capacities and properties.
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chemical properties and conﬁguration of the components, shows how the properties and
conﬁguration constitute capacities entailing various behaviours, and then clariﬁes how
the behaviours interact to make up the overall behaviour that needs explanation. Again,
in the description of how some behaviours are triggered, intrinsic events will crop up.
Before we broaden our scope to mechanistic explanation in general in the next section, I
should return to the normativity of function ascriptions. If an artefact does not malfunc-
tion, an explanation along the lines I have sketched should be perfectly satisfactory, but
what happens when we want to know how a malfunctioning artefact works or is supposed
to work? In other words: What happens when the explanandum is interpreted norma-
tively? As in: How is this thing supposed to work? In such cases, I think the explanans
‘inherits’ the normative force of the original proper function ascription, that is, the explan-
ans is no longer factually correct, but describes how the artefact ought to behave, top-
down style, or which properties and capacities it ought to have, bottom-up style, given
its proper function. So while the pattern of explanation does not change, the explanation
should now be read as a normative account of how the artefact ought to behave and which
properties and capacities it ought to have. The normative force of this ‘ought’ derives from
the normativity of the original function ascription. To the extent that this original function
ascription is justiﬁed, the ascriptions of behavioural roles and physical capacities to the
artefact components in the explanans will also be justiﬁed. Of course, as with function
ascriptions to complete artefacts, there are limits on what can justiﬁably be ascribed to
artefact components in an artefact explanation. These limits have to do with our scientiﬁc,
experiential, or other knowledge of the physicochemical make-up of the components and
social practices and institutions. Other contributions to this issue discuss such constraints
on function ascriptions (e.g. Scheele, 2006; Vermaas & Houkes, 2006). If, however, we
want to know why an artefact malfunctions, the normative ‘ought to’ explanans is still use-
ful for pinpointing where and how malfunction occurs. Since the behavioural and struc-
tural decompositions describe the behavioural roles of the components and their
interactions, they also provide a host of information about malfunction—what happens
if some component fails to behave as it should. Such information would certainly be help-
ful for the notoriously diﬃcult task of diagnosing speciﬁc instances of malfunction.
5. From artefact explanation to mechanistic explanation
How does this account of artefact explanation relate to other accounts of mechanistic
explanation? Recent debate on mechanistic explanation has ﬂeshed out the rudimentary
comments by early writers on the topic, but I think my two mechanistic explanatory strat-
egies bring out some shortcomings in other work. I will brieﬂy introduce the mechanicists’
project and then show how it is hampered by a failure to recognize the diﬀerence between
structural and functional understanding.
Mechanicists want to develop the familiar intuition that causal explanation is all about
showing how underlying mechanisms and structures produce the event to be explained.
The intellectual fathers of this idea, Railton (1978) and Salmon (1984), cashed out the
notion of mechanism purely in terms of causality and causal interactions. The ‘new
mechanicists’ think this conception of mechanisms is too narrow; there is more to mech-
anisms than just causality. Inspired by Simon’s (1996) and Wimsatt’s (1976) work, they
start from the idea that mechanisms are complex systems and then try to develop that
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I can discuss here (e.g. Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Glennan, 1996, 2002; Machamer
et al., 2000; Craver, 2001), so I will limit myself to two recent exponents that give a fair
impression of the general idea.
A good place to start is Glennan’s deﬁnition of a mechanism:A mechanism for a behaviour is a complex system that produces that behaviour by
the interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be
characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations. (Glennan, 2002,
p. S344)This deﬁnition intends to capture a number of important aspects of mechanisms. First,
that it only makes sense to talk about mechanisms for behaviours, not mechanisms simpli-
citer. Mechanisms are relativized to the behaviours they produce. Secondly, mechanisms
consist of material parts or objects; they are not just sequences of processes. Thirdly,
mechanisms produce their behaviour by the causal interaction of their physical parts.
The interactions must be invariant in Woodward’s sense (Woodward, 2003), meaning
roughly that they should support a relevant range of counterfactuals. Glennan puts his
deﬁnition to work in an account of mechanistic explanation. To explain a regularity is
to give a mechanical model:a description of a mechanism, including (i) a description of the mechanism’s behav-
iour; and (ii) a description of the mechanism which accounts for that behaviour.
(Glennan, 2002, p. S347)This model is the explanation: (i) is the explanandum and by virtue of showing why (i)
is correctly ascribed to the mechanism in question, (ii) forms the explanans. A partic-
ular behaviour that needs explanation is explained by a description of the mechanism
for that behaviour, which includes a description of how the parts of the mechanism,
triggered by an outside event, interact sequentially to produce the behaviour being
explained.
Craver (2001) describes how mechanisms of the sort described above enable an account
of multilevel mechanistic explanation. For behaviour b of an item, we can give (1) a con-
textual description of that behaviour, (2) an isolated description, and (3) a constitutive
description. The three descriptions correspond to diﬀerent perspectives; (1) places the
behaviour in a larger system with its own behaviour to which b contributes, (2) is a
description of b in isolation, and (3) shows how b is brought about by sub-behaviours
of parts of the item. By employing these perspectives, science uncovers hierarchical mech-
anisms and behavioural roles played by the components of these mechanisms. Craver
claims that such role ascriptions to items are important scientiﬁc achievements since they
allow us to assign items their proper place in the multi-layered picture of how our world
works.
I now want to present two related criticisms on these accounts that derive directly from
what I have said above about mechanistic explanation. My complaints do not primarily
concern what the mechanicists do say, but rather what they do not say—it seems to me
that they rely too heavily on hand waving when they talk about describing mechanisms
and their behaviours.
First, they do not distinguish between the types of understanding conferred by my
top-down and bottom-up strategy. This seems largely due to a failure to analyze in
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Glennan’s characterization of a mechanical model (Glennan, 2002, p. S347, see above)
does not stipulate whether the sort of information in a description of a mechanism is to
be given in behavioural terms or also in terms of physical parts and their conﬁguration
and physicochemical properties. As I have argued in Section 3, those two options lead
to either behavioural or structural insight into a mechanism’s operations. Craver (2001)
does take a stand on the issue; he is clearly talking about top-down behavioural role
explanations. As a result his analysis fails to take account of the fact that explanation
exclusively in terms of hierarchies of behaviour is impossible in the sense that details
about the underlying implementation always permeate a supposedly purely behavioural
explanation. First, in determining how particular sub-behaviours are to be decomposed.
Because it is usually possible to have more than one functionally equivalent implemen-
tation, the choice for a particular implementation dictates how the behavioural role gets
decomposed. As an example, think of how Edison’s decomposition of the recording
behaviour would have looked if he had chosen to use one of the other two devices
depicted in his patent. Secondly, implementation details sometimes provide a more
plausible rendering of Craver’s third, constitutive, mode of description. Namely, in
cases where we want to explain ‘basic’ behaviours. In such cases, explanations mention
physicochemical properties in conjunction with the spatial conﬁguration of the mecha-
nism components to explain the behavioural capacities of the components.12 The elas-
ticity of metal explains the paperclip’s capacity to exert a force when its loops are bent
out of position, as opposed to some story about lower level behavioural roles of stuﬀ,
as Craver’s constitutive description has it. By overlooking the role of implementation
details in mechanistic explanation, Craver also overlooks the distinction between the
two diﬀerent strategies of mechanistic explanation.
A second conspicuous omission in the accounts of mechanistic explanation under dis-
cussion is the role and character of bottom-up mechanistic explanation of behaviour.
None of the authors I have been discussing devotes any attention to how the behaviours
they take to be part of a mechanism are often explained by capacities of the constituent
components of the mechanism, which are in turn explained by underlying structural,
that is, physicochemical, and, for a fully general account, perhaps also biological, psy-
chological, social, etc., properties. For instance, Craver states that all there is to learn
about a mechanism is the spatial and temporal organization of the entities and activities
in it:12 It
molecu
beyon
physic
stipulaOne understands a mechanism by discovering its component entities and activities,
and by learning how their activities are spatially and temporally organized . . . .
Understanding how a mechanism works is just understanding how one activity leads
to the next through the spatial layout of the components and through their partici-
pation in a stereotyped temporal pattern of activities from beginning to end. (Craver,
2001, pp. 60–61)may be objected that such explanations must ultimately be couched in terms of behavioural roles of
les, atoms, and elementary particles. While this might be a conceivable possibility, it is certainly not
d doubt that it is in fact feasible. Neither is it clear that this is an adequate interpretation of what low-level
al explanation really does. It would be rather imprudent to have such issues settled beforehand by
tions deriving from our favoured account of mechanistic explanation.
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edge of the spatial and temporal organization of mechanism parts is important—my
strategies also include such information—but even with this knowledge it makes perfect
sense to ask how these spatially and temporally organized behaviours are made possible
by the structural characteristics of the objects or materials that make up the mechanism.
An answer to this question seems to me a legitimate part of a mechanistic explanation,
which adds to our understanding of the mechanism in question.
Hence, in my view, existing work on mechanistic explanation lacks an appropriate sen-
sitivity to the distinction between a top-down and bottom-up strategy of mechanistic
explanation. It could also beneﬁt from paying more attention to how mechanism behav-
iours can be explained by the capacities and structural properties of components, as
opposed to just their spatiotemporal relations. I do not believe that my own account
comes near to accomplishing this task in its full generality, but I do hope to have demon-
strated that it grasps some important features of mechanistic explanation and that it does
so better than the other accounts I discussed.
6. Conclusion
To sum up, my account of mechanistic artefact explanation includes two diﬀerent com-
plementary explanatory strategies. The top-down strategy takes the overall behaviour of
the artefact that needs explanation, decomposes it into constituent sub-behaviours, and
then ascribes these sub-behaviours to structural components of the artefact. It also
describes how the various behaviours interact spatiotemporally to make up the overall
behaviour. Human action enters the explanation as intrinsic events, which provide the
antecedent conditions for particular sub-behaviour manifestations. This strategy ‘black-
boxes’ details about the underlying physical structures. The second, bottom-up, strategy
starts from physicochemical and spatial information about the artefact’s components
and then shows how these structural features ground behavioural capacities. By discussing
how the behaviours resulting from the capacities interact in space and time, it demon-
strates how the overall behaviour is brought about. Human action enters this story in
the same way as it did in the ﬁrst strategy. Either strategy provides self-contained expla-
nations and is not intrinsically in need of the other, but the two do naturally favour dif-
ferent contexts; structural understanding as provided by the bottom-up strategy is
especially appropriate in engineering contexts, and the top-down strategy’s behavioural
understanding generally suﬃces for everyday contexts, but is also important in early stages
of engineering design.
It seems to me that my two strategies are equally well applicable to mechanistic expla-
nation outside the domain of artefacts and technology. Nothing makes them exclusively
geared towards artefacts as opposed to biological, psychological, sociological, economic,
or other mechanisms.
I want to conclude with a more general and admittedly imprecise thought that is trig-
gered by my account of mechanistic artefact explanation. If the point made above about
top-down behavioural understanding being self-contained is correct and if mechanistic
explanation is, as its original proponents certainly seem to have had in mind, a ubiquitous
style of scientiﬁc explanation, it follows that it can be perfectly acceptable to explain phe-
nomena by describing behavioural roles of constituent mechanism parts without saying
anything about how these parts implement their behavioural roles. Hence, there is nothing
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tion and there is no intrinsic need for explanation to always seek as low a level of causal
detail as possible. I propose to call this feature of top-down mechanistic explanation real-
ization-independency. We can explain and learn about certain high-level behaviours even
when we are largely ignorant of the underlying physical reality. In fact, the truth about
the underlying details simply does not matter for the quality of the top-down explanation.
They may be metaphysically abstruse beyond any philosopher’s wildest fantasies; as long
as they satisfy the behavioural-role ascriptions at the higher level the explanation is still
good. This is a fascinating result since it implies that any account of explanation which
holds that more information about underlying details is necessarily better is misguided.13
Such a view is not only held by straw men. For instance, Jon Elster subscribes to it when
he claims: ‘[A] more detailed explanation is also an end in itself’ (Elster, 1985, p. 5).
Michael Taylor seems to be thinking along the same lines: ‘A good explanation should
be, amongst other things, as ﬁne-grained as possible’ (Taylor, 1988, p. 96). Railton’s
(1978) and Salmon’s (1984) accounts of causal explanation also seem to be sympathetic
to the pro-detail attitude. Against such views, my top-down strategy suggests that there
is a legitimate explanatory role for information that does not concern ﬁner grain or more
detail. My view here is similar to what other philosophers have claimed about, for
instance, explanation in the social sciences (Jackson & Pettit, 1992) or the special sciences
in general (Fodor, 1974).
Structural and behavioural understanding of an artefact, or other mechanism, is use-
ful from an explanatory point of view. Structural understanding shows one exactly how
a particular mechanism implements a piece of behaviour. In an engineering context, such
understanding of artefacts is highly useful because it diﬀerentiates between the detailed
implementation choices to be made in ﬁguring out the details of a new design. Behav-
ioural understanding, however, exhibits how a particular complex behaviour can be cre-
ated out of simpler behaviours, independent of the particular realization of these
behaviours. For artefacts, such understanding is valuable in that it diﬀerentiates between
possible ways of creating a complex behaviour out of simpler ones. Engineers need this
understanding to think of conceptually diﬀerent ways to create a particular complex
behaviour, and ‘lay people’ may ﬁnd it useful to get a broad grasp of how an apparently
sophisticated piece of behaviour is created out of simpler sub-behaviours, without hav-
ing to worry about how it is exactly that these sub-behaviours are made possible by the
physics of the artefact. These two distinct types of understanding and explanatory strat-
egies are both valuable contributions to our knowledge of technical artefacts or of other
mechanisms.
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